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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of
LLOYD A. FRY COMPANY,
Civil No. 13980
Appellant,

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The appellant, Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, respectfully
petitions the Court for a rehearing on the decision rendered
on December 30, 1975, affirming the findings of the Utah Air
Conservation Committee that emissions from Fryfs plant
violated Section 3.2 of the Code of Air Conservation Regulations
providing that emissions shall be of a shade in density no
darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black), upon the
following grounds:
1.

The Court did not fully consider the question of

the constitutionality of the Air Conservation Act.
2.

The decision does not correctly assess the facts,

nor does it apply the standard necessary for the Air Conservation
Committee to prove the alleged violation.
3.

The procedure set out in the Act does not safeguard the

right of a person accused of violating its regulations to a
fair hearing.

There is inherent prejudice and bias in the

administrative process conducted in this instance.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AIR CONSERVATION ACT.
The Statute is unconstitutional on its face for the
following reasons:

(a)

r

It permits an administrative agency

to impose a criminal penalty for an alleged violation of its
regulations without the necessity of compliance with constitutional
standards of proof in determining whether a violation occurred;
and (b) the procedure followed by the examining committee in
conducting a hearing as to whether a violation has occurred
is inherently unfair to the accused.
We have no quarrel with the statement in the opinion
that under Section 26-24-11(1)(a) the procedure under which
the Air Conservation Committee (hereinafter called "Committee")
determines whether a violation of its regulations has occurred,
is administrative in nature; however, it is of vital importance
that due consideration be given to the constitutional ramifications
of the original procedure by which the Committee makes a
determination, the method of the determination, and its
effect.
Section 26-24-11(1)(a), the procedure by which the
Committee determines a person is in violation of its regulations,
is set out as follows:
Violations - Notice - Hearings - Orders Variance - Exceptions. - (1)(a) Whenever the
executive secretary has reason to believe that a
violation of any provision of this act or any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rule, regulation, or standard issued under it, has
occurred, he may cause written notice to be served
upon the alleged violator or violators. The
notice shall specify the provision of this act or
rule, regulation, or standard alleged to be violated,
and the facts alleged to constitute the violation
and may include an order that necessary corrective
action be taken within a reasonable time. Any
such order shall become final unless, no later
than twenty days after the date the notice and
order are served, the person or persons named
therein request in writing a hearing before the
committee. Upon such request, the committee shall
hold a hearing. In lieu of an order, the executive
secretary may require that the alleged violator or
violators appear before the committee for a hearing
at a time and place specified in the notice and
answer the charges complained of, or the committee
may initiate an action pursuant to section 26-2413.
It is clear from this section that the executive secretary
of the Committee, a hearing examiner of the Committee, or
any committee member as hearing examiner, can make a decision
which, in effect, results in a final order of violation.
The decision from which this Petition arises held that the
moving party, the Air Conservation Committee, or anyone
charging a violation of this Act, need not prove that charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, a review of the entire

Air Conservation Act, it its entirety, compels the conclusion
that in order for the Act to be constitutional, the Committee
making a charge that a violation exists under this Act, or
the rules, regulations, etc. thereunder, must prove that
charge beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish
guilt.
The "constitutional problem" becomes apparent in the
Committee's decision pursuant to Section 26-24-11 (1) (a),
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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when considered in conjunction with Section 26-24-13(1)(a),
which states:
Any person who violates any provision of this
Act, or any rule, regulation, order (other than an
order requiring compliance with an implementation
plan), or standard in force under this Act, other
than Section 26-24-16, or who causes or permits to
be caused air pollution as defined in Section 2624-2 of any air resource of the state, shall be
guilty of an offense and subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000 for each day of violation.
***

The Act provides that the Committee can determine under an
"administrative hearing procedure1' whether or not a "violation11
has occurred.

Under Section 26-24-13, if a violation has

occurred, the person in violation is "guilty of an offense
and subject to a fine
of violation."

of not more than $10,000 for each day

The wording of this Statute clearly sets out

a criminal penalty.

Granted, the Statute is vague and

indefinite; however, if possible, the legislative intent
must be taken directly from the four corners of the Statute
in order to comprehend its full force and effect.

Here, the

Legislature has provided that if a violation is determined,
which, if the decision of the Supreme Court is allowed to
stand, can be determined by an administrative agency, then
the violator is "guilty of an offense and subject to a fine
of not more than $10,000 for each day of violation."

The

Statute goes on to increase the amount of fine from $10,000
to $25,000 and even $50,000 for each day of violation under
a determination made by an administrative agency without the
constitutional guarantee that the Committee has the burden
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As stated in the Supreme Court case of Huntington v, Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224 (1892).

the test as to whether a

statute is penal, according to the United States Supreme
Court, Mis not by what the name the statute is called by the
legislature or the courts of the state in which it was
passed, but whether it appears to the tribunal which is
called upon to enforce it to be, in its essential character
and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public,
or a grant of a civil right to a private person."

It is

clear that the effect of the Air Conservation Act is penal
in nature.

It provides for a penalty, it holds that an

individual in violation is "guilty of an offense," and

,

thereafter subject to a fine of not to exceed $10,000 per
day.

Certainly, the language used in the Statute sheds

light on the legislative intent that the effect of the
Statute is to punish the "violator" for an offense against
the public.

Certainly, an administrative committee has the

right and duty to formulate regulations to carry out the
objectives of a statute, but to permit the committee in this
instance to set up rules, hold a hearing on whether a person
has violated the rules, find the accused guilty, and then
levy a criminal penalty, i.e., a fine of $10,000 a day,
is analogous to permitting the IRS to charge a taxpayer for
failure to pay taxes, hold a hearing, find him guilty, and
levy a penalty, without ever proving the accused's guilt in
a court proceeding.
Presently, there is a criminal action pending against
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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'

the appellant in the Bountiful City Court (Exhibit A).

Note

that the action was quiescent until the date of this decision,
and has now been reactivated.

Query:

Can the decision of

the Committee be used as evidence in this criminal proceeding?
If an additional action can also be brought against Fry, and
the determinations made by the Committee holding the appellant
in violation admitted as evidence of guilt, certainly Fry
has suffered a violation of "due process."

In addition, the Court

is invited to consider that, statutes imposing fines and
penalties are penal in nature and have, and always will be
strictly construed.

36 Am.Jur.2d Forfeitures and Fines,

Section 8, p. 615.
The statement in the opinion that "Fry's claim that the
burden of proof was upon the state to prove that the plume
did not contain uncombined water is erroneous," misconstrues
the definition of a contaminant as set out in the Statute,
and the Code of Air Conservation Regulations.

1.1.3 of the

Code states:
Air contaminant means any particulate matter or
any gas, vapor, suspended solid or any combination
thereof, excluding steam and water vapors (Section
26-24-2(1), UCA, 1953, as amended).
3.2.6. (d) states:
An emission failing to meet the standard because
of the effect of uncombined water shall not be in
violation.
This does not mean that uncombined water is an exception to
the regulation, but can only mean that water vapor is not a
contaminant.

Certainly, the committee which asserts a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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violation has the burden of proving that a plume which is
observed to be more than 40% opaque, equivalent to No, 2
Ringelmann, is not opaque because of water vapor, which is
not a contaminant.

A plume of pure steam (water vapor) can

exceed 40% opacity and is not a violation.

The decision

seems to indicate that if an inspector reads a plume as in
excess of 40% opacity, there is a presumption of violation
irrespective of whether the plume contains uncombined water
vapor.

There is no statement in the decision that the

Committee has the burden of proving the charges by a preponderance
of the evidence.

Even where a criminal penalty is not

involved, the principle is well established that a moving
party who asserts a proposition has the burden of proving
the assertion by a preponderance of the evidence.

2 Am.Jur.2d,

Sec. 391 states:
It is generally held that the proper allocation
of the burden of proof is among the essential
rules of evidence which must be observed in adjudications by administrative agencies. As in court
proceedings, the burden of proof, apart from
statute, is on the party asserting the affirmative
of an issue before an administrative tribunal.
This is usually the claimant, complainant, or
applicant, but the party resisting a claim may
have the burden of proving a bar to such claim,
such as a statutory exception, and, while the
burden of proof never shifts, the burden of proceeding
with the presentation of evidence does shift.
In disciplinary administrative proceedings, which in
some aspects are analogous to this situation, the burden of
proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative.

Johnstone

vs. Daly City, District Court of Appeals, First District,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Division 2, California, 319 P.2d 756 (1958) is illustrative
of the general rule.

This case involved a mandamus proceeding

to compel a city manager to restore petitioner to position
of public inspector.

The Court said:

In disciplinary administrative proceedings,
burden of proof is upon party asserting the affirmative
and guilt must be established to a reasonable
certainty and cannot be based on surmise or conjecture,
suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or uncorroborated
hearsay.
The case of St. Lewis vs. Eskridge, Missouri, 486
S.W.2d 648 (1972) cited in the opinion in opposition to
Fryfs contention that the burden is on the Committee to
prove that the plume did not contain uncombined water vapor,
is not in point.

That decision involved a prosecution under

a criminal statute, in which the defendant was convicted of
violating an nair pollution control ordinance."

The appellate

court held that information alleging defendant had violated
the ordinance was not defective for failure to allege that
the emission was not due to "presence of uncombined water."
Obviously, this case involved a pleading question on whether
the prosecution in the information was required to negate an
exception to the ordinance.

Again, the presence of uncombined

water vapor is not an exception to Section 3.2.1 of the
Code, because water vapor is not a contaminant.
POINT II
THE DECISION DID NOT ASSESS THE EVIDENCE AND THE WEIGHT
TO BE GIVEN IT IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING UNCONTROVERTED
FACTS.
The smoke school maintained by the Committee, trained
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the students to read smoke plumes from an imcomplete combustion
process under inside controlled conditions at a distance of
ten feet.

The students1 readings were compared with equivalent

opacity on a Ringelmann chart.

No training was given on wet

plumes (white), and there was and. is no other plume in the
State of Utah emitted as a result of a process similar to
Fry.

The training for reading a wet plume, according to

Alvin Rickers, who was in charge of instruction at the smoke
school, was for the student to observe a couple of situations
in the field.

His testimony is quoted verbatim as follows:

Q. Now, what actual training do you give them
which would enable them to determine when the
water vapor is dissipated out of a wet plume?
A. At this school we have not come up with a
means to do this from our smoke generator. Anything that goes past that--first of all, we want
to stay as objective as we can in our smoke school
and, therefore, we have to use our meter for our
authority on what's being emitted. If we are to
inject water into the system and it was not all
condensed when it went by that meter, then we
wouldn't know what we have. Consequently, we do
not do that in that portion of the school.
Q. Well, just what training do you give them
in helping them to determine when a water vapor in
a plume is dissipated from the plume?
A. For our enforcement personnel, and these
are the people that are going out continuously on
this type of thing, before they are released to
make any contact by themselves with the public.
In other words, before they are given that authority,
they go out with experienced people who give them
some training and it doesn't take much training.
It's just a matter of showing them a couple of
situations and after; that it's fairly easily
recognized.
Q. Of course, the distance the plume travels
before the water vapor is dissipated from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plume, again, depends upon the weather conditions,
the amount of humidity in the air and a number of
other things, doesn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell me, were you taken out to be
trained in determining at what point the water
would be dissipated from the water plume; did
somebody take you out?
A. Yes, A former employee of the organization
took me out.
Q»

And, how many times were you taken out?

A. I only went out with him once.
all that was needed.

That was

Q. Well, I didn't ask you that. You only went
out with him once. Just answer my question, if
you will.
A.

Okay.

Q.

And, where did you make this training?

A.
tion.

This was out at Kennecott Cooper Corpora-

Q. Does Kennecott Copper Corporation have the
same kind of processes that Fry Roofing has?
A. No.
Q. Well, then, prior to the time you made your
evaluation you had never had any training in
determining when the water vapor became separated
from the plume so far as the processes similar to
the Fry Roofing Company is concerned?
A. No.
***

Q. Now, as a matter of fact, there isn't any
other process in the State of Utah where felt is
saturated with asphalt as is done in the Fry
Roofing plant, is there?
A.

Not that I know of.

Q.

That's the only one?
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A,

It's the only one.

The Committee's witnesses conceded that Msubjective
variations11 in readings could range from 1% or less (Tr.
72).

In the HEW study introduced into evidence as Exhibit 3

on page 28, are the results of evaluation of white training
plumes by six inspectors, indicating a wide range of subjective
variation.
It was conceded by the executive director of the Committee,
Grant Winn, that the fact that there isn't a definite break
in the plume at the point where the water vapor dissipates,
requires a subjective estimate by the viewer as to where the
water vapor evaporates (Tr. 30). The evidence was uncontroverted
that the emission from the Fry stacks is of a higher temperature
than the ambient surrounding air.

It doesn't require evidence

to establish, and the court can judicially notice that upon
contact with the outside atmosphere, the edges of the plume
would cool first, condensing the moisture, and the cooling
process would continue towards the center of the plume until
all of the moisture was dissipated, which would have to be a
gradual process, the rapidity of which would depend upon
existing atmospheric conditions: temperature, humidity, wind
and barometric pressure.

The testimony that there is an

abrupt break in the plume where all the water vapor is
dissipated is incredible and not probative evidence (Tr. 2630).
In answer to a question from the chairman of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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examining committee, the witness Rickers testified that they
instructed students, when taking a reading, to have the sun
to their back,

that they be perpendicular to the effluent

stream, and that they be two and one half stack lengths away
from the stack when the observation was made (Tr. 100). The
evidence was conclusive that there was no compliance with
uniform guidelines by the inspectors in taking the readings,
some made in observation, some made at different positions
and for different lengths of time (See appellant!s brief,
pp. 32-35).

It is worthy of note that the inspectors did not

use a Ringelmann Chart on the site for comparison in reading
the Fry plume, but compared the opacity of the plume with their
memory of the designated shades of opacity shown on the chart.
That their memory of the opacity shades shown on the Ringelmann
Chart tends to become inaccurate is indicated by the requirement
that the inspectors1 "eye-balls" be recalibrated every six months.
Some of the inspectors observed a more dense plume from the
east stack than the west stack which was impossible as all
of the moisture driven out of the felt by the impact
of the hot

asphalt was collected in an overhead steel hood

and could only be emitted from the west stack (Tr., Vol. II,
p. 134), casting further doubt on the reliability of those
readings.
The decision cites the case of State vs. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co. 9 Or. A189, 495 P.2d 751, 51 ALR3d 1007 (1972)
for authority that the weight to be accorded the testimony
of the smoke readers and conflicting testimony of the experts
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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on the accuracy and reliability of smoke reading was within
the perogatives of the fact finders.

It is interesting to

note that this was a court decision (not an administrative
hearing) in which Fry was found guilty of violating air
pollution rules. That case involved reading a Mwet plume."
Objections were made by Fry that the testimony of the nsmoke
readers" was inadmissible because they had no training in
reading a wet plume. The testimony was admitted because the
readings were 80% opacity, double the 40% opacity limitation.
The Court felt that the high reading of 80% eliminated the
effect of subjective error. The Court said:
The training CWAPA gives its smoke readers as ~
to wet plumes may well not be optimum, and this
presents a close question concerning the admissibility
of Bispham's and McDonald's testimony. Since they
testified that defendant s plume obscured 80 per
cent or more of the background (or, in other
words, more than twice the amount of background
obscuration to constitute a violation), and since
there was no showing that the amount of visible
water in defendant's plume could have such a
substantial impact on their readings, we resolve
this close question in favor of the state. We
agree with both trial judges in their conclusion
that the variables revealed by these records go to
the weight and not the admissibility of Bispham's
and McDonald's testimony.
In this instance there was no reading higher than 60%, one
of which was made on the emission from the east stack.
In 51 ALR3d 1038, 1039, the editor quotes the decision
of Bortz Coal Co. vs. Air Pollution Com. (1971, Pa. Cmwlth)
1 ELR 20393, as follows:
Pointing out that the expert used none of the
available instruments for testing smoke emissions
or falling particulate matter and made no stack
tests, the court concluded that if employees of
the commission were allowed to determine that
smoke a particulate matter emissions were in
violation of regulations, based solely upon visual
observations, then there would be really no need
to have standards and regulations at all. Visual
tests and observations are not, the court said,
adequate evidence of violation, where recognized
scientific
tests
available.
Expressing
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with the Ringelmann Smoke Chart, the court expressed puzzlement as to why such an inexpensive
method of testing was not used and why an engineer
employed by the Commonwealth would not be equipped
with such an inexpensive device. A citizen whose
business is about to be destroyed by an abatement
order, the court declared, is certainly entitled
to that much consideration (the use of test instruments) in the establishment of his alleged violation.
The above language seems appropriate in this situation.
There was no evidence that the emission from the Fry
plant, including the particulate, was a contaminant as
defined in the statute.

26-24-2(3) provides:

"Air pollution" means the presence in the
ambient air of one or more air contaminants in
such quantities and duration and under conditions
and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious
to human health or welfare, animal or plant life,
or property, or would unreasonably interfere with
the enjoyment of life or use of property, as
determined by the standards, rules, and regulations adopted by the air conservation committee.
The record is absent of any evidence that the emission
was or tended to be "injurious to human health or welfare,
animal or plant life, or property, or would unreasonably
interfere with the enjoyment of life or use of property."
There was no evidence of any complaint from any individual
concerning a problem with the Fry emissions.

The plant is

located in the North Salt Lake industrial area, and reference
to the photographs, Ex. 15 and 15A, certainly do not show
the type of emission which would have an adverse effect on
people or the environment, particularly when the evidence
was undisputed that the Fry process does not involve combustion,
and is composed of 97.7% water and 2.3% asphalt.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Granted, whether an emission is a contaminant is to be
determined by standards, rules and regulations adopted by
the Air Conservation Committee,

But those standards, rules

and regulations must have a factual basis to meet constitutional
requirements.

See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, cited in

appellant's brief.
Again, we say that the definitions of air pollution as
set out in the Utah Statute negates the contention that
opacity is the equivalent of air pollution.
POINT III
THE PROCEDURE SET OUT IN THE ACT DOES NOT SAFEGUARD THE
RIGHT OF A PERSON ACCUSED OF VIOLATING ITS REGULATIONS TO A
FAIR HEARING. THERE IS INHERENT PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS CONDUCTED IN THIS INSTANCE.
The smoke readers are employees of the State of Utah
and are directly related to the Air Conservation Committee
through the Department of Health.

The charges and alleged

violations are then analyzed by the Air Conservation Committee
themselves, who are charged by law to enforce their own
regulations.

Whenever a hearing is held on the matter, it

is supervised by a legal advisor who, in this case, was John
Spencer Snow, who participated in writing the brief on
appeal.

We do not contend that Mr. Snow did not attempt to

decide questions of law in an impartial manner; however, he
is an advocate, and it is most unusual for him to act as
impartial legal advisor, to then participate in writing the
Committee's appeal brief and then argue it.

From the very

beginning, this was not an adversary proceeding, and it
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could not be under the circumstances.
The hearing was attended by Federal EPA employees, who,
although they had no official interest in the outcome, were
constantly communicating with members of the hearing committee
at times while the hearing was in process.

There was also

continuous communication between the members of the hearing
committee and its witnesses, which disrupted the hearing to
the extent that at one point it was necessary for Fry's
counsel to make an objection (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 127), which
was sustained by the legal advisor.

The transcript clearly

shows that the Committee took the position that the burden
was on Fry to prove that it was not in violation, which was
a violation of due process.
CONCLUSION
Everyone is in favor of ffclean air" and of reasonable
regulation of industry to obtain that objective. However,
we do live in an industrial age, which has given this nation
the highest standard of living enjoyed by any country in the
world.
If the Fry plant can be closed down, based upon the
type of subjective testimony given in this case, without
regard to the requirements of constitutional standards of
proof, the precedent established will certainly encourage
a depressing effect on existing and the future expansion
of industry in this State, contrary to the public interest.
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We submit the decision should be withdrawn and a
rehearing granted.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, WADSWORTH $ RUSSON

RI^AiiJsl

!

Hr^^^\

torfrey foi\JApp<
foi\l Appellant
Attorney
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
HAND-DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing
this"^/^| day of Februa r y

1976, to John Spencer Snow, Assistant

Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

w \^O^Ly^
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EXHIBIT "A"

January 6, 1976

Rex J. Hanson
Attorney at Law
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

State -vs- Lloyd A. Fry Roofing

U-722

Dear Mr* Hanson:
Please be advised that arraignment in the above
matter has been scheduled for Monday, January 19,
1976 at 2:00 P.M. in the Bountiful City Court,
745 South Main, Bountiful, Utah.
You will be required to appear with your clieht
at that time*
If you have any questions, please contact the Court.
BOUNTIFUL CITY COURT

Deputy Clerk
cc

I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full true and correct
copy of the LETTER TO APPEAR on file in the Bountiful City Court.
Arden F. Jenson, Clerk
By Janet Davis Deputy Clerk

SW^

^Ja^t^z,
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IN THE CITY COURT OF BOUNTIFUL, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff,

:

VS.

:

SUMMONS

LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY, :
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

:

)
«

COUNTY OF DAVIS ) SS

THE STATE OF UTAH TO LLOYD A FRY ROOFING COMPANY:
You are hereby summoned to appear before me at my
Court in Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah, oh the
£"**

day of C/^^'vjfc

1973, at**?;*** o'clock, to

answer a charge made against you upon the complaint of
Richard L. Harvey, for violating the Visible Emissions Standards
of the Utah State Division of Health Code of Air Conservation
Regulations, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 26-24-5 and
26-15-5.
Dated at Bountiful , Davis County, State of Utah,
this OG

day of July, 1973-

/b-t//"7 J
Yyl-

—^

S. Mark Johnson/'Judge
Defendant's Address:
Process Agent:

C. T. Corporation &vstern
175 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah
J-

'•

•

r

—

I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full true and correct copy
of the SUMMONS on file in the Bountiful City Court.
'-*
Arden F. Jenson, Clerk
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By_Janet Da^ie, Deputy Clerk

IN THE CITY COURT OF BOUNTIFUL, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY

:

Defendant.

COMPLAINT

:

On this lJ> day of July, 1973, before me, S. Mark
Johnson, Judge of the Bountiful City Court, personally
appeared Richard L. Harvey, who being duly sworn by me on
his oath, complains and says that:
1.

The Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, is a Delaware

Corporation, General Offices located in Illinois, registered
to conduct business within the State of Utah, with a facility
operating in Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah;
2.

That Richard L. Harvey is the Administrator

of Environmental Health Services for Davis County, Utah, and
as such has authority to investigate violations of the Utah
Air Conservation Act.
3.

That on June 27, 1972; July 6, 1972; July 13,

1972; July 17, 1972; July 27, 1972; August 3, 1972; August 7 f
1972; August 10, 1972; August 15, 1972; August 31, 1972;
September 5, 1972; September 14, 1972; September 21, 1972;
October 2, 1972; November 22, 1972; December 27, 1972;
January 23, 1973; and February 20, 1973, at Woods Cross,
County of Davis, State of Utah, the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Company did on each date specified commit the offense of
violating the Visible Emissions Standards of the Code of Air
Conservation Regulations, Part Three (3) of the Utah State
Division of Health Cod£ of Air Conservation Regulations f
enacted under authority of Utah Code Annotated Sections 26-24-5
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-2and 26-15-5, as follows: That on the above dates the Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Company caused the emission of an effluent into
the atmosphere which was Of Shade or density darker than a
No. 2 Rengelmann Chart (40% Black) or an equivalent opacity,
for which offenses the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company itiay b6
subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 for each day of such
violation.

/

Complainant

Subscribed and sworn before me the day and year first above
written.

^y&^y

S. Mark Johnson, Judge

I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full true and correct
copy of the COMPLAINT on file in the Bountiful City Coutt.
Arcten F. J e n s o n , Clerk
By Janet Davis
Clerk

•

&

• • :
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